my mind on books

Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood by Simon Evnine (Oxford University Press, 2008)

Product description:

Simon Evnine examines various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second-order beliefs about their own and others’ beliefs, and are agents, capable of making long-term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one’s beliefs and that one treat one’s future beliefs as, by and large, better than one’s current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. Ideals of rationality that require such objectivity, while not necessarily wrong, are intrinsically problematic for persons. This “aspectual dualism” is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences support a traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.

More from the publisher, including a sample chapter

Author’s webpage

Dance-tech.net has produced this interview with philosopher Alva Noë. If you have any trouble playing the embedded video go here and try a different format.

Alva Noë’s most recent book is Action in Perception (MIT Press, 2005, pbk 2006)

The Case for Qualia (Bradford Books) edited by Edmond Wright (MIT Press, 2008)

Product description:

Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of indirect realism, the philosophical position that has qualia as a central tenet) include Michael Tye, Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and even Frank Jackson, a former supporter. Qualiaphiles apparently face the difficulty of establishing philosophical contact with the real when their access to it is seen by qualiaphobes to be second-hand and, worse, hidden behind a “veil of sensation”–a position that would slide easily into relativism and solipsism, presenting an ethical dilemma. In The Case for Qualia, proponents of qualia defend the Indirect Realist position and mount detailed counterarguments against opposing views.

The book first presents philosophical defenses, with arguments propounding, variously, a new argument from illusion, a sense-datum theory, dualism, “qualia realism,” qualia as the “cement” of the experiential world, and “subjective physicalism.” Three scientific defenses follow, discussing color, heat, and the link between the external object and the internal representation. Finally, specific criticisms of opposing views include discussions of the Churchlands’ “neurophilosophy,” answers to Frank Jackson’s abandonment of qualia (one of which is titled, in a reference to Jackson’s famous thought experiment, “Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary”), and refutations of transparency theory.

Contributors:
Torin Alter, Michel Bitbol, Harold I. Brown, Mark Crooks, George Graham, C. L. Hardin, Terence E. Horgan, Robert J. Howell, Amy Kind, E. J. Lowe, Riccardo Manzotti, Barry Maund, Martine Nida-Rümelin, John O’Dea, Isabelle Peschard, Matjaž Potr?, Diana Raffman, Howard Robinson, William S. Robinson, John Smythies, Edmond Wright.

MIT Press has the Table of Contents and samples

Qualia at Wikipedia

 Experimental Philosophy edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (Oxford University Press, 2008) has a release date of July 15 according to Amazon, but is showing as “in stock” over at the publisher’s. (A web search also turned up a book release party on July 8 for those in the NYC area!)

Product description:

Experimental philosophy is a new movement that seeks to return the discipline of philosophy to a focus on questions about how people actually think and feel. Departing from a long-standing tradition, experimental philosophers go out and conduct systematic experiments to reach a better understanding of people’s ordinary intuitions about philosophically significant questions. Although the movement is only a few years old, it has already sparked an explosion of new research, challenging a number of cherished assumptions in both philosophy and cognitive science.
The present volume provides an introduction to the major themes of work in experimental philosophy, bringing together some of the most influential articles in the field along with a collection of new papers that explore the theoretical significance of this new research.

Both Knobe and Nichols can be seen on “bloggingheads.tv”.

Lots of enticing new reviews at Metapsychology Online Reviews this week, including these:

• Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World by Zenon W. Pylyshyn
• Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind by Evan Thompson
• Consciousness and Mental Life by Daniel N. Robinson
• The Concept ‘Horse’ Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual Investigations by Kelly Dean Jolley