on ‘The Looking-Glass Self’ by John V. Canfield
August 18, 2007
Misunderstanding the grammar of certain uses of “I,” we take it to be a singular referring expression. We are then left with the job of saying what sort of thing the referent of “I” is. The metaphysical issue, “What is the nature of the self?” thus results from a radical mistake about how language functions.
We have no trouble finding the “I” of “I am unshaven” or “I have a broken arm”; “I” here picks out a certain person. Nothing out of the ordinary here; persons live and breathe, move in space and time. But it is not so easy to find a referent for the “I” of “I feel happy” or “I think…” and like expressions.
In casting about for some suitable referent for “I,” for these cases, we may project our common garden concept of a person inward, thereby contriving a pseudo-person who has all the powers of a real person – thinking, perceiving, acting – but lacks the characteristic of occupying or filling up space, that is, lacks a body. To repeat: the need to invent this pseudo-person arises from the conviction, gained without argument or reflection, that “I,” like proper names and singular pronouns, refers.
(John V. Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self, p. 90)
I was intrigued to see that John V. Canfield has a new book coming out: Becoming Human: The Development of Language, Self and Self-Consciousness, since his earlier work The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness has been a favorite of mine. So I dug out my notes and found the excerpt quoted above. The Looking-Glass Self explores Wittgenstein’s views on the self with some Zen blended into the mix as well. Canfield is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Toronto; his writing is clear and accessible to non-philosophers. The Looking-Glass Self is out of print and used copies are scarce, so check your library or ask for it through interlibrary loan. [update: Amazon has “Look inside the book” so you can read some online.] I’m looking forward to his new book.